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TO THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT: COMMENTS ON KYLIE V CCMA 2010 4 SA 
383 (LAC) 
 
KJ Selala* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
On 28 May 2010, the Labour Appeal Court delivered a judgment in the case of Kylie 
v CCMA1 regarding the jurisdiction of the CCMA to resolve a dispute of unfair 
dismissal involving a sex worker. Coincidentally, the judgment was handed down on 
the eve of the FIFA 2010 World Soccer competition, held in South Africa,2 when a 
large contingent of sex workers were reportedly expected to descend on the shores 
of the Republic to ply their trade during the tournament.3 Unsurprisingly, given the 
controversy attached to the issues, the judgment was well noted in the media and 
drew some quite interesting commentary in legal circles.4 In the judgment delivered 
by Davis JA, with which Zondo JP and Jappie JA concurred, the Court overturned a 
previous judgment of the Labour Court,5 where it was held that the CCMA ought to 
have refused to grant a relief to the employee because by doing so it would have 
been sanctioning or encouraging illegal activity. The Labour Appeal Court held that 
the CCMA did have the jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, regardless of the fact that 
sex work is an illegal activity.6 In justifying the conclusion it reached the court 
premised its argument on section 23(1) of the Constitution,7 which provides that 
everyone has a right to fair labour practices. The Court reasoned that the word 
"everyone" is a term of general import and unrestricted meaning and that it means 
what it conveys.8 Of the main issues examined by the Court was if a person such as 
a sex worker was entitled to enjoy constitutional rights in general, and specifically 
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1
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC). 
2
 The FIFA Soccer World Cup kicked off in Johannesburg on the 10
th
 of June 2010. 
3
 Le Roux 2010 www.mg.co.za; Kwinika 2010 nehandaradio.com; Skoch 2010 
www.globalpost.com. 
4
 Le Roux 2010 www.mg.co.za. 
5
 Kylie v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1918 (LC). 
6
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 61. 
7
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). 
8
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 17. 
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those rights set out in section 23 of the Constitution. Relying on the minority 
judgment of O’Regan and Sachs JJ in S v Jordan,9 the Court held that the illegal 
activity of a sex worker does not per se prevent the sex worker from enjoying a 
range of constitutional rights, including the right to fair labour practices. 
 
The purpose of this case note is to analyse the judgment critically and to consider its 
implications for the future of labour litigation in South Africa. The correctness of the 
judgment, in particular, and especially insofar as it relates to the jurisdiction of the 
CCMA, or the Labour Court, to resolve disputes of the nature presented by the case, 
will be questioned. It will be argued that the Court erred in finding that the CCMA has 
the jurisdiction because jurisdiction is not only a question of interpretation but a 
matter of fact. It is either there or not. Jurisdiction, as will be shown, is predicated on 
the twin pillars of the court’s authority over the litigating parties and the court’s ability 
to grant an effective judgment. As the Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated, the 
courts are concerned with legality.10 And, to suggest that the requirement of legality 
in the determination of jurisdiction is unconstitutional, as the judgment implies, would 
no doubt be in conflict with the same Constitution that the courts seek to uphold. In 
this analysis, therefore, the main question will be this: should the Constitution, as the 
supreme law, be interpreted as conferring on the courts and tribunals jurisdiction to 
enforce any transactions which are in conflict with the law? Inevitably, the Courts’ 
approach to the main issues raised by the appeal will be critically examined. 
Consequently, it will be argued that both the CCMA and the Labour Court’s decisions 
were correct insofar as the jurisdictional ruling on the matter was concerned. 
 
2 Factual background 
 
The appellant, a certain Ms Kylie, (hereinafter the employee) was employed in a 
massage parlour as a sex worker. Her employment was terminated without a proper 
hearing. She then referred a dispute of unfair dismissal to the CCMA for arbitration. 
In the light of the fact that the employee was a sex worker, the CCMA Commissioner 
ruled that she did not have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute because sex work is 
                                                          
9
 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC). 
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 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 30. 
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strictly prohibited by legislation.11 The Commissioner argued that section 23 of the 
Constitution and the Labour Relations Act12 (hereinafter the LRA) did not apply to 
workers who did not have a valid and enforceable contract, which was the situation 
in this instance, as the employee was engaged in an invalid contract. This decision 
of the Commissioner was then taken on review to the Labour Court. 
 
In the Labour Court,13 the employee’s argument was that the Commissioner 
committed a legal error in excluding workers who did not have a valid and therefore 
enforceable contract from the ambit of the LRA, because the LRA defines employees 
to include anyone ‘who works for another person’ and accordingly the Act applies to 
all employment relationships irrespective of whether they are underpinned by 
enforceable contracts or not.14 In the light of the approach taken in argument, the 
Labour Court sought to clarify at the outset what its judgment was about and which 
issues it does not decide. The Labour Court stated that its judgment does not decide 
(1) that a sex worker is an employee for the purposes of the LRA, just that neither 
the CCMA nor the Court should enforce the statutory right to a fair dismissal under 
the LRA; (2) that a sex worker is not entitled to protection under the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act, occupational health legislation, workers’ compensation or 
unemployment insurance and; (3) the issue as to whether or not the definition of 
employee in the LRA applies to those in an employment relationship without a valid 
contract.15 In the Court’s opinion, the proper approach to the issues would not be to 
ask whether a sex worker was an employee within the ambit of the definition in the 
LRA or not. The correct approach, as the Court determined, would be to ask whether 
as a matter of public policy courts (and tribunals), by their actions, ought to sanction 
or encourage illegal conduct in the context of statutory and constitutional rights.16 It is 
submitted that this approach was correct. Consequently, the Labour Court found that 
the CCMA Commissioner ought to have refused to grant the relief sought by the 
employee because by doing so the CCMA would have been sanctioning or 
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 Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. 
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 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
13
 Kylie v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1918 (LC). 
14
 Kylie v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1918 (LC) para 12. 
15
 Kylie v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1918 (LC) para 4. 
16
 Kylie v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1918 (LC) para 23. 
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encouraging prohibited commercial sex.17 In effect, the Labour Court’s judgment 
confirmed the CCMA’s jurisdictional ruling on the matter. It is this decision of the 
Labour Court which gave rise to the judgment of the Labour Appeal Court under 
discussion. 
 
3 The decision of the Labour Appeal Court 
 
Two main issues stood out for the determination by the Court. Firstly, the Court had 
to determine whether or not the CCMA Commissioner was correct in her 
jurisdictional ruling, and/or whether or not the Labour Court was correct in its 
approach and assessment of the law and consequently its judgment. Secondly, and 
depending on its finding against the judgment of the Labour Court, if a remedy avails 
to an employee involved in the kind of the employment relationship presented by the 
case. 
 
The Court commenced with an analysis of the Labour Court judgment. It noted that 
while the Labour Court conceded that Kylie was an employee for the purposes of the 
LRA, the Labour Court did not acknowledge her rights to relief or the enforceability of 
her rights in terms of the LRA simply because she was a sex worker and therefore, 
in the opinion of the Labour Court, not entitled to protection against unfair 
dismissal.18 On the other hand, the Court also noted the submissions made on 
behalf of the employee. According to the employee, the Labour Court adopted a 
wrong approach in its judgment. Instead of commencing with the Constitution, that is, 
whether or not a person such as the employee enjoyed constitutional rights in 
general and specifically those entrenched in section 23(1),19 the Labour Court, so it 
was submitted, started with the discussion on policy as divined from the law of 
contract.20 Further to that, the employee argued that it should be only after the 
question of the application of the Constitution has been answered, and if in the 
favour of the employee, that the Court would be required to proceed to determine the 
                                                          
17
 Kylie v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1918 (LC) para 93. Although the Court’s approach to the matter was 
different from the CCMA’s, its decision nevertheless vindicated the position of the CCMA 
Commissioner regarding its jurisdictional ruling. In this case note it is contended that both the 
CCMA and the Labour Court’s decisions were correct. 
18
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 3. 
19
 Section 23(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
20
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 14. 
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issues of remedy, and that it would be at this stage that the question of policy would 
come in.21 This submission, seemingly, impressed the Court. The Court stated that 
since the dispute was predicated on the application of the LRA, it would be 
necessary to commence with the Constitution, to examine the application of section 
23(1) to the facts of the dispute.22 In its analysis the Court noted that section 23(1) 
provides everyone the right to fair labour practices and that the word ‘everyone’ is a 
term of general import and unrestricted meaning - it means what it conveys.23 The 
Court then made reference to the minority judgment of the Constitutional Court in S v 
Jordan.24 In the latter case O’Regan and Sachs JJs had held that prostitutes are not 
stripped of rights to be treated with dignity simply because the nature of the work 
they undertake devalues the respect that the Constitution regards as inherent in the 
human body.25 The Court then turned to confront the key question, that is, whether 
section 23 affords protection to a sex worker. In its judgment the court found that it 
does. In support of this conclusion reference was made to a few cases, among 
others, NEHAWU v UCT26; SANDU v Minister of Defence27; State Information 
Technology Agency (Pty) Limited v CCMA28; and Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber.29 
 
With reference to NEHAWU v UCT the Court observed the Constitutional Court’s 
emphasis that the focus of section 23(1) of the Constitution was on the relationship 
between the worker and the employer and the continuation of that relationship on 
terms that are fair to both.30 The Court further noted that in SANDU v Minister of 
Defence the Constitutional Court considered the question as to whether members of 
the armed forces constituted workers for the purposes of section 23(2)31 of the 
Constitution. With reference to the latter case the Labour Appeal Court found that 
even if a person is not employed under a contract of employment, that does not deny 
                                                          
21
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 14. 
22
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 15. 
23
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 16. 
24
 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC). 
25
 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 20. 
26
 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC). 
27
 SANDU v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 482 (CC). 
28
 State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC). 
29
 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 2005 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). 
30
 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) para 40. 
31
 That section provides that every worker has the right- (a) to form and join a trade union; (b) to 
participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and (c) to strike. 
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the employee all constitutional protection.32 Based on the State Information 
Technology (Pty) Limited v CCMA and the Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber cases, the court 
summarised its approach thus: 
 
In summary, as sex workers cannot be stripped of the right to be treated with dignity 
by their clients, it must follow that, in their other relationship namely with their 
employers, the same protection should hold. Once it is recognised that they must 
be treated with dignity not only by their customers but by their employers, section 
23 of the Constitution, which, at its core, protects the dignity of those in an 
employment relationship should also be of application.33 
 
Having decided that the sex worker meets the threshold requirement for 
constitutional protection, that is, being the beneficiary of the applicable constitutional 
rights,34 the Court turned to examine the question of relief. The Court noted that 
compensation for a substantively unfair dismissal would be inappropriate in the 
present kind of case. By contrast, however, the Court held that monetary 
compensation for a procedurally unfair dismissal would appear to be applicable in 
the appropriate case where the services rendered by the employee are classified as 
illegal. For this, the Court reasoned that this kind of compensation is independent of 
the loss of illegal employment and is treated as a solatium for the loss by an 
employee of her right to a fair procedure.35 Regarding the future application of the 
LRA to cases of a similar nature the Court stated that for the reasons given in its 
judgment, cases involving employment relationships which are in breach of 
legislation, such as the present dispute, should proceed through the constitutional 
threshold but not all will enjoy the defining weight of public policy so as to justify the 
granting of a remedy.36 
 
                                                          
32
 SANDU v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 482 (CC) para 21. 
33
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 26. 
34
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) paras 21-28. 
35
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 53. 
36
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 57. 
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4 Analysis of and comment on Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) 
 
4.1 The Court’s approach to the issues 
 
The judgment, in my opinion, is problematic and quite erroneous on various levels. 
First, it is not readily ascertainable from the judgment what the main issues are. In its 
judgment the Court commenced with the background on the facts of the case, the 
submissions made by the parties both in the CCMA and the Labour Court, and the 
analysis of the Labour Court’s judgment.37 Since the matter was an appeal against 
the decision of the Labour Court regarding its jurisdictional ruling, it was expected of 
the Labour Appeal Court to introduce, right at the beginning of its judgment, the main 
issues and the legal questions to be decided. Instead, the Labour Appeal Court 
cluttered the issue of jurisdiction with the question of the sex worker’s entitlement to 
constitutional rights, such that the latter consideration overshadowed the main issue, 
which is jurisdiction. It is submitted that this approach contributed immensely to the 
Court’s losing focus on what the main issue for determination in the appeal was.38 
 
Secondly, the approach of the Court on the question of jurisdiction is, with respect, 
erroneous. As will be argued here below, instead of placing a heavy reliance on the 
rights of the person as an employee, the Court should have considered equally the 
nature of the dispute and the circumstances surrounding it to determine whether or 
not the dispute was enforceable in the courts. Linked to the Court’s approach to the 
case is the order granted. The Court’s order, it is submitted, is confusing and to 
some extent impracticable. An extensive argument in support of this contention is 
made below. 
 
It is important to emphasise that this case hinged predominantly on jurisdiction, 
hence the order granted by the Court. In its approach, the Court preferred to decide 
the issues from the constitutional rights perspective. What the Court seemingly failed 
to do, though, was to put the dispute in a clearer perspective from the onset. 
Nevertheless, the Court proceeded on the basis that section 23 of the Constitution 
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 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) paras 1-15. 
38
 There is absolutely no doubt that the main issue before the Court was jurisdiction. The other 
aspect, namely the protection of the constitutional rights, was simply an ancillary matter. 
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was the premise from which all issues related to the dispute could be addressed. In 
this regard the Court stated that ‘since the dispute was predicated on the application 
of the LRA, it is necessary to commence with the source of the LRA, that is, to 
engage in an examination the application of section 23(1) to the present dispute’.39 
The Court accepted that the word "everyone" in section 23(1) of the Constitution is a 
term of general import and unrestricted meaning, and that it conveys what it 
means.40 In the Court’s reasoning, it would not matter if the employee was a criminal 
or involved in any other form of criminal activity as employment: the right to fair 
labour practice is available to everyone including a sex worker. 
 
This reasoning of the Court seems attractive but cannot be accepted entirely without 
qualification. As a matter of logical construction, it is submitted, the right to fair labour 
practices is not available to "everyone" in the strictest literal sense, but applies 
exclusively to those persons who are involved in an employment relationship.41 It is 
distinct from other rights such as the right to life, the right to dignity, and the right to 
equality, all of which depend for their existence simply on the fact of one’s being 
human. The latter rights are actually fundamental human rights which accord to 
every human being by reason of being alive. In contrast, the right to fair labour 
practices is available only to persons who are involved in an employment 
relationship. It is submitted that the Court’s extensive examination of this concept 
was unnecessary because the status of the employee was not an issue in dispute in 
this case. All that was required or expected of the Court was to confirm, as the Court 
correctly did, that the employee was an employee for the purposes of the LRA and 
the Constitution.42 Surprisingly, the Court then proceeded to determine if the 
employee was entitled to relief.43 
 
It is submitted, with respect, that this was a step prematurely taken by the Court. 
Instead of proceeding to consider the question of relief, the Court should have 
proceeded to consider the nature of the employment contract or relationship to 
                                                          
39
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 15. 
40
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 16. 
41
 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) para 40; SANDU v Minister of 
Defence 1999 4 SA 482 (CC) 481 para 22; Hannah v Government of the Republic of Namibia 
2000 4 SA 940 (NmLC). 
42
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 28. 
43
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 28. 
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determine whether or not it was legally enforceable. That examination, it is argued, 
was meticulously done by Cheadle J in the Labour Court.44 As will be shown below, 
it is not only the Court’s power to hear a party that determines jurisdiction but most 
importantly the Court’s power to give an effective judgment which is the key. 
 
4.2 The test for jurisdiction 
 
In Ewing McDonald & Co Ltd v M & M Products Co45 the Appellate Division, as it was 
then known, defined the term jurisdiction as ‘the power vested in a Court by law to 
adjudicate upon, determine and dispose of a matter.’ In the determination of 
jurisdiction, the requirement of legality is therefore the overriding consideration. As 
Ngcobo J correctly noted in S v Jordan,46 the Constitution is concerned with legality 
and not desirability. Furthermore, as Professor Theophilopoulos has quite correctly 
observed, jurisdiction is predicated on the twin pillars of the court’s capacity to take 
cognizance of a case, to hear it, to give judgment and to enforce its decision.47 
Further, it is the power to give an effective judgment and not merely power over the 
defendant which is the test of jurisdiction.48 To determine if the court is able to render 
an effective judgment is thus a matter of common sense. 
 
It is convenient to pause for a moment to examine if the CCMA or the Labour Court 
was able to render an effective judgment in this matter. Section 193(1) of the LRA 
provides for reinstatement as the primary remedy against a substantively unfair 
dismissal.49 This remedy is to be preferred against any other remedies unless there 
are compelling reasons why compensation should be more appropriate in the 
circumstances. Furthermore, the use of the peremptory word ‘must’ in subsection (2) 
                                                          
44
 Kylie v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1918 (LC) paras 28-37. 
45
 Ewing McDonald & Co Ltd v M & M Products Co 1991 1 SA 252 (A) 256G. 
46
 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 30. See also Makhanya v University of Zululand 2010 1 SA 
62 (SCA) 70 para 22. 
47
 Theophilopoulos 2010 Stell LR 132. 
48
 Pistorius Jurisdiction 4. 
49
 That section provides as follows: "If the Labour Court or an arbitrator appointed in terms of this 
Act finds that a dismissal is unfair, the court or the arbitrator may- (a) order the employer to 
reinstate the employee from any date not earlier than the date of dismissal; (b) order the 
employer to re-employ the employee, either in the work in which the employee was employed 
before the dismissal or in other reasonably suitable work on any terms and from any date not 
earlier than the date of dismissal; or (c) order the employer to pay compensation to the 
employee." 
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indicates that the onus rests on the employer to provide compelling reasons why 
reinstatement should not be ordered.50 
 
In considering the question of appropriate relief, the Court acknowledged the 
possible difficulties that the CCMA or the Labour Court would be confronted with 
when dealing with cases such as the present one. The Court pointed out, quite 
correctly it is submitted, that reinstatement would not be appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case, because by ordering reinstatement, the CCMA or Court 
would manifestly be ordering for violation of the provisions of the Act.51 The Court 
stated emphatically thus: 
 
… this judgment does not hold that, when a sex worker has been unfairly 
dismissed, first respondent or a court should or can order her reinstatement, which 
would manifestly be in violation of the provisions of the Act. … Manifestly, it would 
be against public policy to reinstate an ‘employee’ such as appellant in her employ 
even if she has could show, on the evidence, that her dismissal was unfair.52 
 
In a similar vein, the Court stated that: 
 
[F]or similar reasons it may well be that compensation for a substantively unfair 
dismissal would be inappropriate in the present kind of case. If compensation for 
substantive unfairness is to be regarded as a monetary equivalent for the loss of 
employment, it may be, although given the precise relief sought I express no final 
view, that such compensation would be inappropriate in a case where the nature of 
the services rendered by the dismissed employee are illegal.53 
 
What this concession boils down to is that the Court appreciated the fact that with 
the kind and nature of the case before it, it would be virtually impossible, sometimes, 
for a court or the CCMA to render an effective award or judgment. This is especially 
true in cases where the dispute raised by the employee is based on substantive 
unfairness only. It follows, as a matter of logic, therefore, that in all disputes involving 
sex workers as employees, and/or any other employment relationships which are 
                                                          
50
 Subsection (2) provides that the Labour Court or the arbitrator must require the employer to 
reinstate or re-employ the employee unless- (a) the employee does not wish to be reinstated or 
re-employed; (b) the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are such that a continued 
employment relationship would be intolerable; (c) it is not reasonably practicable for the employer 
to reinstate or re-employ the employee; or (d) the dismissal is unfair only because the employer 
did not follow a fair procedure. 
51
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 51. 
52
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 52. 
53
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 53. 
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characterised by an element of illegality, the courts may not be able to render 
effective judgment and may therefore not assume jurisdiction to resolve the dispute 
involved.54 
 
In employment relationship disputes, then, the proper approach is for the court to 
determine jurisdiction in terms of the LRA and the legal rules applicable to the 
dispute before it. In so doing the court or the CCMA would scrutinise the nature of 
the dispute to determine if there are any traces of illegality in the particular 
transaction giving rise to the dispute. This determination may, however, be 
effectively done after a proper examination of the true nature of the dispute has been 
undertaken by the court. In this regard the guidance given by the Constitutional 
Court in NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd55 is apposite: it is the duty of a court to 
ascertain the true nature of the dispute between the parties. In ascertaining the real 
dispute a court must look at the substance of the dispute and not at the form in which 
it is presented.56
 
The true nature of the dispute, or the real issue, in this matter (Kylie) 
was not at all about the protection of the constitutional right to fair labour practice 
(section 23(1)), as presented by the employee, but the jurisdiction of the CCMA to 
deal with that kind of dispute. 
 
It is submitted that had the Court followed the above approach, it would undoubtedly 
have been impossible for it to come to the conclusion it reached. 
 
4.3 The relevance and appropriateness of section 23 to the case 
 
As argued above, the Court’s approach in deciding this matter, specifically its heavy 
reliance on section 23 of the Constitution, was unnecessary. It is submitted that, by 
adopting the approach which it did, the Court seemingly lost sight of the purpose of 
the LRA, namely to be the exclusive statute regulating labour relations.57 In 
NAPTOSA v Minister of Education, Western Cape58 the Court held that a litigant may 
not bypass the provisions of the LRA and rely directly on the Constitution without 
                                                          
54
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) paras 59-60. 
55
 NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 3 SA 513 (CC). 
56
 NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 3 SA 513 (CC) para 52. 
57
 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) para 14. 
58
 NAPTOSA v Minister of Education, Western Cape 2001 2 SA 112 (C) 123I–J. 
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challenging the provisions of the LRA on constitutional grounds. A similar view was 
taken by Ngcobo J in Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) (Treatment 
Action as Amici Curiae).59 
 
In its approach, the Labour Appeal Court seems to have ignored the fact that the 
employee bypassed the relevant provisions of the LRA and relied directly on the 
Constitution to seek a remedy. The employee did not challenge any specific 
provision of the LRA on constitutional grounds. Instead, she contended that the 
approach adopted by the Labour Court was wrong because that approach effectively 
excluded her from enjoying her constitutionally entrenched right to fair labour 
practices.60 But does the LRA provide no remedy? Clearly the employee is covered 
by the definition of ‘employee’ in the LRA. It is trite that the LRA is aimed to be a 
one-stop shop dispute resolution structure in the employment sphere,61 and that the 
Labour Courts and the Labour Appeal Court derive their jurisdiction from it.62 In its 
approach, therefore, the Court should have started with the LRA, and not the 
Constitution, in deciding the question of jurisdiction in this matter. It goes without 
saying then that the Court was clearly misguided in its reliance on section 23 of the 
Constitution in deciding the matter. This conclusion, though, does not in any way 
suggest that the Court, in adjudicating any particular employment dispute, may not 
rely on the Constitution to determine the dispute. What is in fact contended is that 
section 23(1) may not exclusively be invoked to determine jurisdiction. Other factors, 
such as the possibility of rendering an effective judgment, as argued above, should 
also be considered. 
 
Based on the abovementioned authority,63 it is clear that the Court’s invocation of 
section 23 of the Constitution at the jurisdictional stage was inappropriate. The 
employee’s challenge was not raised against a provision of the LRA. If there were 
any legal rule which had the effect of (unconstitutionally) ousting the CCMA or 
                                                          
59
 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as Amici 
Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC); see also SANDU v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) 420 
para 51. 
60
 The employee’s argument appears in the judgment as recounted by the court in paras 14-15. 
61
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) para 54. 
62
 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) para 30. 
63
 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) paras 14 and 30; NAPTOSA v 
Minister of Education, Western Cape 2001 2 SA 112 (C) 123I–J; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 4 
SA 367 (CC) para 54. 
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Court’s jurisdiction to the detriment of the employee, such a legal rule would, 
obviously, be tested against the LRA. For that purpose section 21064 of the LRA 
would have been used to safeguard the LRA against any undue intrusion. 
 
The next issue to be considered, and this is quite critical in this analysis, is the 
implication of the Court’s judgment for the Constitution and for the future of labour 
litigation in general. 
 
4.3 May a constitutional provision be interpreted as conferring on the court 
the jurisdiction to enforce illegal transactions? 
 
It is important first to set out the legal principles relating to illegal contracts in our law. 
It is a fundamental principle of our law that any act done contrary to the direct 
prohibition of the law is void and of no effect.65 This principle is applied by courts in 
all legal systems based on the rule of law and is a necessary incident of the rule of 
law in the same way as the doctrine of legality is.66 Accordingly, if a contract is 
illegal, the courts regard the contract as void and therefore unenforceable.67 
 
In the course of its assessment of the legal issues, the Court accepted the 
employee’s argument that the illegal activity of a sex worker does not per se prevent 
the latter from enjoying a range of constitutional rights.68 In support of this view the 
Court made reference to the minority judgment of O’Regan and Sachs JJ in S v 
Jordan69 where it was held, in part: 
 
[T]he very character of the work they undertake devalues the respect that the 
Constitution regards as inherent in the human body. This is not to say that as 
prostitutes they are stripped of the right to be treated with respect by law 
enforcement officers. All arrested and accused persons must be treated with dignity 
by the police. But any invasion of dignity, going beyond that ordinarily implied by an 
arrest or charge that occurs in the course of arrest of incarceration cannot be 
                                                          
64
 That section provides that "[i]f any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises 
between this Act and the provisions of any other law save the Constitution or any Act expressly 
amending this Act , the provisions of this Act will prevail". 
65
 Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99 109, as quoted by Cheadle J in Kylie v CCMA 2008 
29 ILJ 1918 (LC) para 28. 
66
 Kylie v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1918 (LC) para 30. 
67
 Kylie v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1918 (LC) para 32. 
68
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 20. 
69
 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC). 
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attributed to section 20(1A)(a) but rather to the manner in which it is being enforced. 
The remedy is not to strike down the law but to require that it be applied in a 
constitutional manner. Neither are prostitutes stripped of the right to be treated with 
dignity by their customers. The fact that a client pays for sexual services does not 
afford the client unlimited license to infringe the dignity of the prostitute. 
 
It submitted that the Court’s reference to the abovementioned authority was not at all 
helpful to its reasoning. Firstly, as correctly categorised by the majority judgment in S 
v Jordan,70 per Ngcobo J, the case was concerned with the commercial exploitation 
of sex and not an infringement of dignity nor unfair discrimination,71 nor in the 
present context, a dispute about the right to fair labour practices. Secondly, many of 
the views expressed by the minority judgment were rejected in the majority 
judgment.72 In support of the reasoning based on the sex worker’s right to dignity, 
the Court recorded its observation that within the South African context many sex 
workers are particularly vulnerable and are exposed to exploitation and vicious 
abuse,73 and for that reason are entitled to some constitutional protection designed 
to protect their dignity, which protection by extension has now been operationalised 
in the LRA.74 It is submitted that this line of reasoning is, with respect, equally 
unsound. The reasoning is not supported by any relevant legal authority and appears 
to be more inventive than considerate of the current legally relevant authority.75 That 
a sex worker forms part of a vulnerable class does not mean that the court is bound 
to assume jurisdiction simply because of that fact. What if the particular sex worker is 
one of those sex workers in the plush suburbs of Johannesburg who charges R20 
000 a night and does not need the protection? In other words, is it necessary to 
conceive of the litigant as a victim in order to want to come to her aid?76 By the same 
token, the fact that a person has a right to life or to be treated with dignity does not 
mean that the courts should come to his or her assistance if he or she surrenders 
                                                          
70
 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC). 
71
 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) para 28. 
72
 S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) paras 30-31, and the order of the court in para 32. 
73
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 43. 
74
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 44. 
75
 See the Court’s rejection of the prevailing authority as set by the Supreme Court of Appeal, and 
the reasons for that rejection, at para 50 of the judgment. Admittedly, and as the Court correctly 
noted, those judgments were delivered before the present Constitution came into operation but, 
nevertheless, it is submitted that the new constitutional dispensation, and more specifically 
section 23(1), did not take away the fundamental rules of procedure regarding the determination 
of jurisdiction for the courts. 
76
 Le Roux 2010 www.mg.co.za. 
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such rights by engaging in acts which conflict with the law. To hold otherwise would 
certainly lead to absurdity. 
 
Without overstating the fact, this case hinged purely on jurisdiction. The key question 
in this analysis therefore is simply if the common law requirement of legality in the 
determination of a court’s jurisdiction in employment disputes indeed offends against 
the provisions of the Constitution, specifically the right to fair labour practices 
(section 23). Should it be accepted also that the Constitution, as the supreme law of 
the land, confers in general jurisdiction on the courts and tribunals to adjudicate 
matters and disputes flowing from illegal activities? Clearly, the answer cannot be 
anything close to affirmative. It is to be hoped that this matter will attract the attention 
of a superior court soon, and that a definitive pronouncement will be made. 
 
 
5 The significance of Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) 
 
Sex work is illegal in South Africa, yet it exists. It is not difficult to imagine how many 
cases would flow into the labour litigation mainstream following this judgment, the 
nature of the cases that the CCMA Commissioners are likely to be confronted with 
on a daily basis, and the reaction of the Commissioners upon receipt of such cases. 
One can think of quite a number of examples of cases other than those involving sex 
workers which the CCMA Commissioners and the South African community at large 
would frown upon, or even hate to think of them being dealt with by the legitimate 
legal structures of government. 
 
The following two examples can best illustrate this problem: think of a paid assassin 
whose employment (which is to murder other people for reward) has been 
terminated, who then approaches the CCMA to claim unfair dismissal. Should the 
CCMA really set up a conciliation and subsequently arbitration hearings for such a 
dispute? Another example one can think of is that of a gambler who knowingly 
engages in illegal gambling activities as an employee to promote gambling against 
the relevant legislation. In the case of a dismissal or unfair labour practice dispute 
ensuing between such an employee and his or her employer, should the CCMA 
nevertheless assume jurisdiction to resolve the dispute because the judgment in this 
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matter regards such a person as an employee for the purposes of the Constitution? 
It is submitted that the implications will be quite undesirable and surely, it is 
submitted, would not have been what the Court intended in its judgment. 
 
Before concluding, there is one other issue regarding the Court’s comment on the 
future adjudication of cases involving employment relationships which are in breach 
of legislation which requires a quick examination. The Court stated that "cases 
involving employment relationships which are in breach of legislation, such as the 
present dispute, should proceed through the constitutional threshold but not all will 
enjoy the defining weight of public policy, as set out, so as to justify the granting of a 
remedy".77 
 
It is doubtful if the court really appreciated the implications of this finding. On proper 
interpretation, this statement could mean that all those employees who, but for 
illegality, are employees in terms of section 21378 of the LRA may rely not on the 
LRA to seek a remedy in the CCMA or Labour Court, but directly on the Constitution. 
The implications are that such employees would be excluded from the application of 
the LRA, just as the members of the South African National Defence Force, the 
National intelligence Agency and the Secret Service are.79 If this is indeed what the 
above statement of the Court intended to convey, then the Court’s order, directing 
that the CCMA has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in this case, was absurd. 
Otherwise the Court should not have ruled that the CCMA has jurisdiction, because 
the CCMA is not empowered to resolve disputes which flow directly from challenges 
based on a constitutional provision but enforces the LRA strictly. Only the High 
Court, concurrently with the Labour Court, is empowered to adjudicate disputes in 
respect of alleged or threatened violation of any fundamental right entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights, including those arising from employment and from labour relations.80 
Even if the CCMA were to assume jurisdiction, it is submitted that it would be 
                                                          
77
 Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC) para 57. 
78
 Section 213 of the LRA defines an employee as any person, excluding an independent 
contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to 
receive, any remuneration. 
79
 Section 2 of the LRA expressly excludes from its application the members of the South African 
National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency, and the South African Secret 
Services. 
80
 Section 157(2) of the LRA. 
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prevented from resolving unfair dismissal disputes based on the constitutional 
provision without reference to the LRA, because the concept of unfair labour 
practice, as conceptualised in section 23 of the Constitution, is not defined in the 
Constitution but only in the LRA. In any event, the definition of an unfair labour 
practice in the LRA does not include unfair dismissal.81 Either way, the CCMA would 
still decline jurisdiction because it would not be able to render an effective award. So, 
to make sense of the Court’s judgment in this matter appears to be quite a daunting 
task. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
In the above analysis an attempt has been made to show that the approach adopted 
by the Court in deciding the case is unsupportive of legality. For that reason, it is 
argued, the judgment is problematic. What emerges from the analysis is that the 
Court was apparently not interested in the public policy issues which the facts of the 
case revealed, nor was it concerned with the implications of the judgment on 
effective labour litigation or the credibility of our Constitution in general. Furthermore, 
the reasoning of the Court, especially its finding on jurisdiction, is less than 
satisfactory. The judgment, it is submitted, will have far-reaching implication for the 
conduct of cases in the CCMA in general and in particular in respect of those cases 
which are characterised by elements of illegality. The judgment has undoubtedly 
triggered a new approach to constitutional labour interpretation and with the 
absurdity highlighted in some parts of the judgment, it will surely take a considerable 
time for the CCMA and other courts to get to make sense of it and to appreciate the 
legal force of the judgment. 
 
                                                          
81
 Section 186(2) of the LRA defines Unfair Dismissal as follows: "'Unfair labour practice' means 
any unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and an employee involving – (a) 
unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation (excluding disputes 
about dismissals for a reason relating to probation) or training of an employee or relating to the 
provision of benefits to an employee; (b) unfair suspension of an employee or any other unfair 
disciplinary action short of dismissal in respect of an employee; (c) a failure or refusal by an 
employer to reinstate or re-employ a former employee in terms of any agreement; and (d) an 
occupational detriment, other than dismissal, in contravention of the Protected Disclosures Act, 
2000 (Act No 26 of 2000), on account of the employee having made a protected disclosure 
defined in that Act." 
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Finally, it is submitted that this judgment is not the best of the judgments ever 
delivered by the Court, and unless it is overturned soon, the CCMA Commissioners 
will continue to adjudicate such labour disputes, albeit under a cloud of uncertainty. 
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